| Posted: April 16 2008 at 10:00am | IP Logged
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Final CSB Report on EQ Hazardous Waste Fire and Community
Evacuation in Apex Calls for New Fire Protection Standards, Improved Chemical
Information for Emergency Planners
Apex, North Carolina, April 16, 2008 - In a case study
report released today on the October 2006 hazardous waste fire at the
Environmental Quality Company (EQ), the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) called
for a new national fire code for hazardous waste facilities and for improving
the information provided to community emergency planners about the chemicals
those facilities store and handle.
The fire occurred on the night of October 5, 2006, at the EQ hazardous waste
transfer facility on Investment Boulevard in Apex, a suburb of Raleigh, North
Carolina. The facility was not staffed or monitored after hours, and no EQ
employees were present at the time of the fire. Emergency responders did not
have access to specific information on the hazardous chemicals stored at the
site and ordered the precautionary evacuation of thousands of Apex residents.
The evacuation order remained in place for two days, until the fire had
subsided.
The CSB also today released a new 16-minute CSB safety video, entitled
"Emergency in Apex - Hazardous Waste Fire and Community Evacuation," available
on free DVDs and on the agency's video website, Safetyvideos.gov.
The CSB investigation found that a small fire originated in the facility's
oxidizer storage bay, one of six storage bays where different wastes were
consolidated, stored, and prepared for transfer off-site to treatment and
disposal facilities. Within the oxidizer bay were a number of chemical oxygen
generators, which had earlier been removed from aircraft during routine
maintenance at a facility in Mobile, Alabama. However, they had not been safely
activated and discharged before entering the waste stream. Solid chlorine-based
pool chemicals were stacked on top of the box containing still functional oxygen
generators.
Apex firefighters initially responded to a 911 emergency call from a resident
driving past the facility, who reported observing a haze with a "strong chlorine
smell." When firefighters arrived, they discovered what was still a small
"sofa-size" fire. But that fire spread quickly, most likely as the aircraft
oxygen generators discharged and accelerated the blaze.
"The only fire control equipment on-site consisted of portable, manually
operated fire extinguishers," said CSB Supervisory Investigator Rob Hall, P.E.,
who led the investigation. "The facility lacked fire walls and automatic fire
suppression systems. As a result, the fire spread quickly into other bays where
flammables, corrosives, laboratory wastes, paints, and pesticides were stored."
The bays were separated by six-inch-high curbs only designed to contain liquid
spills.
The facility was destroyed in the ensuing fire and explosions, which sent
fireballs hundreds of feet into the air. About 30 people, including one
firefighter and 12 police officers, required medical evaluation at local
hospitals for respiratory distress and other symptoms that occurred as a plume
from the fire drifted across the area.
Hazardous waste facilities like EQ's are regulated under the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The investigation noted that RCRA
regulations developed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) require
facilities to have "fire control equipment" but do not specify what equipment
and systems should be in place. In addition, there is no national fire code to
define good fire protection practices for hazardous waste facilities.
The CSB investigation identified 22 other hazardous waste fires, explosions,
and releases that have occurred at U.S. hazardous waste facilities in past five
years. More than a third had adverse community impacts, such as evacuations,
orders to shelter, and transportation disruptions.
Federal RCRA regulations require operators to "familiarize" local responders
in advance concerning facility hazards, but do not describe what specific
information must be shared about stored chemicals, or define the frequency of
communications. Similarly, EPA regulations under the 1986 Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act do not require facilities to share information about
hazardous wastes with local agencies, since those wastes are generally exempt
from Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rules requiring
preparation of material safety data sheets (MSDSs).
In fact, the investigation found that EQ had had limited contact with the
Apex Fire Department prior to the October 2006 fire.
"Specific, accurate, up-to-date information on chemical hazards is essential
to emergency response planning," said CSB Board Member William Wark, who
accompanied the investigative team to Apex in October 2006. "Communities have a
fundamental right to know about stored hazardous chemicals that may affect their
health and well-being. For first responders, having prompt access to such
information is a matter of basic life safety."
The CSB report recommended the EPA require that permitted hazardous waste
facilities periodically provide specific, written information to state and local
response officials on the type, approximate quantities, and location of
hazardous materials.
The Board called on the Environmental Technology Council, a trade association
representing about 80% of the U.S. hazardous waste industry, to develop
standardized guidance on waste handling and storage to prevent releases and
fires. The CSB also recommended that the Council petition the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) - an organization that authors national fire codes
- to develop a specific fire protection standard for the hazardous waste
industry. The new standard should address fire prevention, detection, control,
and suppression. Similar NFPA standards already exist for other industries, such
as wastewater treatment.
Earlier, in June 2007, the CSB issued a safety advisory and urgent
recommendations designed to ensure that chemical oxygen generators are safely
activated and discharged prior to transportation and disposal. The advisory
cited findings of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) following the
1996 ValuJet crash in Florida, which was caused when generators activated and
ignited in the plane's cargo bay.
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating
industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects
of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as
well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management
systems. The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety
recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory
agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.
For more information, in Apex contact Dr. Daniel Horowitz at (202) 441-6074. In
Washington, DC, contact Mr. Sandy Gilmour at (202) 261-7614
/ (202) 251-5496 or Ms. Hillary
Cohen at (202) 261-3601 / (202) 446-8094.
Edited by ApexNC.com on April 16 2008 at 10:02am
__________________
Mark Wilson
Editor
ApexNC.com!
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Topic: Chemical Safety Board Report on EQ Fire
